The Importance of Scientific Hearing
Opening illustration — the official trailer for Christopher Nolan's Dunkirk (2017), the film whose sound design inspired this essay.
We are accustomed to using visual models to understand science, but we are far less likely to find or use sound models to understand or explain science. This may be related to the importance of visual perception in our evolution, yet hearing is just as critical to our survival.
Yet we put seeing before hearing in almost all cases, while evolution seems to have made hearing as important. Why would nature give so much complexity and power to hearing if it was less important? Thoughts to keep in mind.
The following video highlights the physiological science behind how we hear.
https://youtu.be/NlyAINZq7E4?is=dQp41UcEygrckVSh
I bring this up as hearing the shapes and functions of scientific processes became as important as visualization in some theories I built recently. Yet science tends to focus heavily on visual data representation.
Sound is not absent from science. Ultrasound, sonar, NMR, the sonification of gravitational-wave and solar data, and phonon spectroscopy all use sound or vibration.
Science tends to treat sound as an instrument rather than as a way of thinking or explaining. Whereas visual representations are taken for granted, while sound representations are unusual.
This essay seeks to explore why this might be the case, not yet to repair it.
I am accustomed to “seeing” sound represented as a wave form, or as various forms of musical notation. Yet when I visualize sound mentally I see either a shape or a process, always associated with an emotion. Skillful film makers never ignore sound quality as being equally important to the visuals.
Sound carries a dimensional sense of space and time that sight alone struggles to hold; it is the two together, in a well-functioning nervous system and body, that give us the fuller picture.
Sound is a pressure wave that unfolds over time, so the ear takes in space and time together. The ear finds where a sound is from tiny differences in when it reaches each ear, and it reads a room's size from how the echoes fade. A picture freezes one moment, while sound carries the moment and its motion at once. The brain combines sight and sound, and the combination is more accurate than either sense alone.
There is an interesting asymmetry here. Humans can almost see through sound: some people echolocate, and most of us can hear the size of a room from its echo. Yet we can hardly see sound itself. Our ways of visualizing it (Chladni plates, spectrograms, waveforms) flatten what the ear holds simultaneously. A chord is one experience to the ear and a stack of lines to the eye.
For many, if they visualize sound mentally, they see a shape or a process, one which is frequently tied to an emotion. Musicians build whole careers around seeing a shape and an emotional content in sound, and in knowing how to apply that in composition. A waveform or a line of notation records sound; your inner image keeps its motion and feeling. Does sound reach emotional centers more quickly than other perceptions? Doubtful but interesting. Yet skillful film makers, ever intent on the best methods of telling a story, tend also to be very good at making sure the sound track carries its weight. As a recent example, Christopher Nolan's Dunkirk, with its score by Hans Zimmer, is a good example. In this film sound is made equal to the visuals rather than placed underneath them. The texture is metallic and industrial, with deep bass, and the ticking of Nolan's own pocket watch runs through it. Zimmer also uses the Shepard tone, an auditory illusion of pitch that seems to rise endlessly without ever arriving. The soundtrack maximizes the held tension, winds up the tension like a watch, and does not let the observer resolve it. A partial resolution comes only at the end, when a human voice reads Churchill's speech from the newspaper as the score moves into a slowed version of Elgar's “Nimrod.” Thus a human voice resolves the tension, in contrast to the heavily industrial music which holds the tension until the resolution. The sound supplies an emotional energy the visuals cannot. In a loose sense it is thermodynamics in disguise: energy stored and withheld, then released. If a filmmaker treats sound as equal to image in order to understand an experience, why doesn't science do the same to understand a process?
Attempting to contrast what is done in science with the concept of what is required in war, met here by invoking Dunkirk, is that both possess a tension that winds before it resolves, a real cost, and, in the Dunkirk case, a human voice that brings the resolution. The struggle to understand better or to survive a war is a thermodynamically expensive path, while drifting into ignorance or into failing to survive is the cheap thermodynamic path.
Why, then, does science put seeing first?
Part of the answer may be the page itself. Science is kept on paper and on screens, and a page holds a picture far more easily than a sound. A graph can be printed, cited and returned to; a sound has to be played, and it is gone again the moment it ends. What is easy to store becomes what is easy to trust.
Part of the answer may be time. A picture can be taken in at a glance and read in any order the eye chooses. Sound will not be hurried. It must be heard in the order it unfolds, at the speed it unfolds, and a minute of sound costs a minute of listening. A science in a hurry chooses the faster sense.
Part of the answer may be the emotion that travels with sound. If the inner image of a sound is a shape or a process tied to a feeling, then hearing brings feeling into the room with it. Science has long trained itself to keep feeling out of the room, and it may distrust the sense that refuses to leave feeling behind. Seeing is believing; hearing is feeling. The first sounds like evidence and the second sounds like art.
And part of the answer may be habit. Once the instruments, the journals and the training are all built around the eye, each new generation learns to see its data before it ever thinks to listen to it. The habit becomes the method, and the method stops being questioned.
None of these reasons says that sound is less able to carry a scientific idea. They say only that our ways of keeping, sharing and trusting knowledge were built for the eye. The filmmaker has no such excuse, and so the filmmaker listens.
What, then, does hearing add?
The first thing it adds is a mathematics performed before anyone decides to do it. The cochlea is a tapering channel whose stiffness changes along its length, so an incoming pressure wave breaks into its frequencies at different places: high tones near the base, low tones near the far end. Békésy measured this travelling wave and described the cochlea as a frequency analyser, work for which he received the 1961 Nobel Prize. The listener does not choose this analysis and cannot switch it off. A chord arrives at the nerve already separated into its parts. The eye does nothing comparable. A spectrogram is the work of a machine; the ear's spectrogram is the ear.
The second thing it adds is the fact that the ear spends energy in order to hear. In 1948 Maurice Gold proposed that the cochlea must feed energy back into the wave it is analysing rather than merely receive it. That turned out to be right: the outer hair cells act as an active process, amplifying faint input by more than a hundredfold, sharpening the discrimination between neighbouring frequencies, and compressing a range of amplitude of a million to one into what a person can hear. Hearing is therefore not a passive registration but an expenditure. The organ pays for its own selectivity. This is the thermodynamics I have been looking for, found in the sense itself: the ear does not receive the world cheaply. It buys a picture of it.
Third, the ear keeps better time than the eye. A listener with normal hearing can detect a gap in a sound of about three milliseconds, and can tell one click from two when the interval between them is a few tens of microseconds. The eye, by contrast, fuses a flicker into a steady light at roughly thirty-five to forty flashes a second, which is about twenty-five milliseconds. The two ears compare the arrival time of the same sound to within some ten microseconds, a difference in path of only a few centimetres. Where a process is fast and ordered, hearing resolves what seeing simply averages. Science studies processes far more than it studies surfaces, and the sense best fitted to a process is the one it consults least.
Fourth, hearing separates many sources from one mixture. The difficulty was named the cocktail party problem by Colin Cherry in 1953, and Albert Bregman built the general account of it in 1990 under the name auditory scene analysis: the auditory system recovers individual streams from a single pressure wave. A room full of people talking arrives at the eardrum as one wave and is heard as a dozen people, a heater, a door. Nothing about the wave arrives labelled. The eye, shown a superposition of this kind, cannot recover the components unless it is told beforehand what they were. This is the capacity I have called holding several dimensions at once, and it is neither a metaphor nor a gift of long training. It is ordinary hearing doing what it does without being asked.
Fifth, hearing reports the space and not only the surface. Listeners judge a room's size from its reverberation, and can often say which room a recording was made in. A photograph of a cathedral shows its walls; the sound of a cathedral tells you what the air inside does to a voice. Sight reports where things are. Hearing reports the medium they sit in and what a disturbance does while crossing it. For anyone whose subject is a fluid, a membrane, a gel, or an atmosphere, this is a sense with a direct line to the thing under study.
Sixth, it cannot be closed. There is no eyelid for the ear. Auditory processing continues through sleep, and the primary auditory regions keep answering sound. Hearing is the sense of the unwanted and the persistent, the one that brings the world in whether or not the observer consents. A discipline that has trained itself to keep feeling out of the room, and that values the ability to look away at will, will naturally prefer the sense it can shut.
Hearing matters to survival for a reason that has nothing to do with pitch. It is the sense that works when the eye cannot. It reports what is behind the head, in the dark, in the tall grass, in the sleep a hunter has to have to be dangerous the next day. There is no eyelid for the ear, and there is no direction the ear has to turn to face. An animal lying still with its eyes shut is not lying helpless, and the reason is that the second sense is still open and still answering.
What the ear delivers about distance is not precise, and it is honest to say so. Out in open ground people systematically underestimate how far off a sound is, and near at hand they do the opposite, bringing distant things closer than they are. The reports are usable, and they are biased. But out in the dark, where the eye delivers no place at all, a coarse and biased place is not a small thing. It is the difference between an animal that knows which way to move and one that does not.
What makes the ear's report usable is that the brain does not take it as it comes. It fills it in, and it fills it in from the other senses. This is not a guess of mine; it has been measured for years under the name crossmodal correspondences, which are the reliable tendencies people show to match a feature in one sense with a feature in another. High pitch goes with small things, with brighter surfaces, with pointed shapes and with positions higher in space. A sound can also change the feel of a surface under the hand, and it changes the taste of what is in the mouth: the same toffee has been rated significantly more bitter when it is eaten to a soundtrack built to sound bitter than to the identical toffee eaten to a soundtrack built to sound sweet, the food held constant and only the sound altered.
The most famous of these matches is the one where most people, shown a rounded blob and a spiky figure, will call the round one bouba and the spiky one kiki. That effect has now been tested across speakers of twenty-five languages and ten writing systems, and it holds in most of them. It does not hold in all of them, which is the part worth keeping: in the same study the agreement ran from a hundred per cent in one language down to thirty-six in another, and three languages showed no effect at all. The correspondence is a tendency the nervous system brings to the world, not a law the world imposes. It is a habit of filling in, and habits can be absent.
So the dimensions hearing reports are not carried whole to the brain by the ear. Position arrives from a comparison between two channels. Distance arrives under- or over-estimated and is corrected against what the eye knows. Pitch arrives already wearing size, brightness and shape, and it goes on to alter the mouth's report. This is what I mean when I say the brain must fill in the dimensions: the sense delivers part of a world and the rest is supplied from the ledger the senses share.
That shared ledger is the last and the largest of the relational facts in this essay. The correspondence is not in the tone and not in the shape; it is between them, and it is maintained by a body that has to act on one world rather than five separate streams of data. A science built on the eye keeps its senses in separate departments and calls that rigour. A science that heard would have to account for the accounting between them, which is a harder and more interesting problem, and the one my own work keeps arriving at from the direction of geometry instead of the direction of the ear.
There is one further thing the ear adds, and it is the reason this essay comes back to the ground my own work stands on.
Begin with where a sound is. Neither ear's signal contains the position of the source. What reaches an eardrum is a pressure wave, and a pressure wave taken by itself says nothing at all about where it came from. The position appears only in the comparison: which ear the wave reached first and by how much, and which ear it reached more strongly. Lord Rayleigh set out the account in 1907 that still stands, that the ear uses the time difference at low frequencies and the level difference at high ones. Two channels, neither of which knows anything about place, and a place in the difference between them.
Consider next what happens in a room. A single handclap leaves the walls and comes back as a dozen arrivals, each carrying its own spatial clues, most of them false. The listener does not hear a dozen claps and does not hear the room's geometry; one event is heard, at the position of the hand. Wallach, Newman and Rosenzweig showed in 1949 that the first arrival governs the heard place while the later copies are suppressed rather than added in, work still studied under the name law of the first wavefront. The position is not read out of the wave. It is a verdict about the order of several waves.
Now the strangest case, and the one I would most want a reader to sit with. Build a sound out of the harmonics of two hundred cycles a second, four hundred, six hundred, eight hundred, and then remove the two hundred itself. The listener still hears a low pitch near two hundred. Schouten, Ritsma and Lopes Cardozo named this the residue in 1962 and showed the ear arrives at it from the spacing between the components that remain. Nothing at two hundred is present in the wave. The pitch is inferred from a relation, and it is heard as plainly as a pitch that is physically there. An instrument reports faithfully that no two-hundred component exists. It is right, and it is describing a sound nobody in the room hears.
Dissonance behaves the same way. Helmholtz proposed that roughness comes from interference between neighbouring partials, and Plomp and Levelt measured the matter in 1965: the dissonance of an interval depends on the separation of the two tones relative to a critical band, and an interval wider than a critical band is heard as consonant. Neither tone is dissonant on its own. The pair is. A single note carries no consonance whatever; the property belongs to the interval, and an interval is a relation and nothing else.
Two further facts make the case sharper, and neither is welcome to anyone who would like the property to sit in the ratio.
The first is that the verdict moves with register. A critical band has a width, and that width is not the same everywhere along the cochlea, so two tones a fixed number of cycles apart fall inside a single band in one part of the scale and outside it in another. Plomp and Levelt's own measurements show the transition between consonant and dissonant shifting as frequency changes, and later work finds register altering judged consonance through roughness. The same interval is therefore rough here and smooth there. The ratio has not moved; the membrane has.
Notice whose words are being used. Rough and smooth are reports from the hand, carried over into the ear, and the carry-over is not a poet's licence. It has been counted. Across a large sample of the world's languages, words meaning rough are unusually likely to carry a trilled or otherwise r-like consonant, a statistical link between a speech sound and the sense of touch; people also match grinding sound textures to surfaces they rate as harder and rougher. So when a listener calls an interval rough, the hand is testifying about the ear, and the ear answers.
The report also has a measurable home, which is the more interesting half. Roughness is not a vague impression. It appears when components beat, or when a tone is modulated, at rates of roughly thirty to three hundred cycles a second, rising to a maximum near seventy and fading again as the rate climbs; for ordinary carrier frequencies the upper limit is set by the same critical band that sets consonance. Smooth, then, is not the absence of an event. It is what the ear reports when the modulation falls outside the band in which the ear can hear it at all. A quality borrowed from the skin turns out to have a mechanism, and the mechanism is the membrane's resolution again.
The second is that the preference for consonance is not simply the aversion to roughness. McDermott, Lehr and Oxenham measured people's liking for chords alongside their liking for non-musical sounds that separated beating from harmonic relationship, and across more than two hundred and fifty listeners only the preference for harmonic spectra tracked the preference for consonant over dissonant chords. Roughness is real and it is measured, but on its own it does not explain why most people turn toward the perfect fifth.
So the character of an interval is a relation between two components, resolved by a membrane whose resolution varies along its length, and weighted by what the listener has already heard. Three relations stacked, and still no single thing anywhere in the account that carries the property.
I once heard a musician teach the ordinary rule: major keys when you want to say something happy, minor keys when you want to say something unhappy. It is worth asking whether that rule is about dissonance at all, since the last few paragraphs would predict it should be.
Partly. A major triad is heard as somewhat more consonant than a minor one, and the account usually given is not beating but fusion — the major's components share a clearer root, so the ear gathers them into one sonority more readily than it gathers the minor's. The difference, if there is one, lies in the arithmetic of the ratios rather than in roughness. So the teacher's rule does point at a relation, but at the relation of simplicity and not at the relation of beating.
That the rule should feel like a law of nature is itself a finding, and it has been tested. Western listeners hear major as happy and minor as sad reliably enough for the pairing to be a cliché; listeners with little exposure to the tradition do not hear it the same way, and the explanation most often offered is familiarity and associative conditioning rather than anything in the chord itself. A study of two communities in northwest Pakistan found harmonic organisation carrying universal and culture-specific cues at once. And listeners with no prior exposure to Western music did recognise basic emotions in short Western excerpts, which suggests that what travels is more likely tempo and loudness than mode. The mode looks like a local dialect; the tempo looks closer to a common grammar.
The historical claim also wants putting carefully, because the measurements are more interesting than the slogan. What has actually been counted in twentieth-century popular music is a rise in the number of chord categories in use across several genres and cultural contexts, and a rise in the inharmonicity and noisiness of recorded sound, decade by decade. Harmonic variety and timbral roughness, then — not one quantity called dissonance, and it is worth saying so before the word is used as though it had been measured. The explicit programme belongs to Schoenberg, whose phrase for it first appears in a 1926 essay: the emancipation of the dissonance, meaning that a dissonance should be comprehensible on the same footing as a consonance. That is an aesthetic decision, argued for rather than discovered.
But the mechanism underneath is the one this essay has been circling. Whether two tones sound rough is a fact about the pair; whether they sound tolerable is a fact about the listener, and the explanation offered is that the ear learns what it meets often. A hundred hearings of an interval buys a new verdict, and the hearings cost something — time, attention, the price of all the music that carried them. So the widening of a culture's ear across a century is not a decay in sensitivity but an expenditure paid in listening. And the relation that carries the character of an interval has turned out to include the listener's own history, which is the longest relation in this essay and the one a science of things keeps leaving out of the account.
None of this is a trick the ear plays by itself. Every sense fills in, and the filling-in is not a rumour about the brain. It is measured, and the cases are famous because they are startling.
Speak a sentence and splice a cough over one phoneme. The listener hears the word whole and cannot afterwards say which sound was missing. Warren reported this in 1970 under the name phonemic restoration: the word is supplied out of the sentence, and the supplied sound is heard as plainly as one that was physically present. Ask which phoneme the cough covered and the report is unreliable. The brain has already written the letter in.
The eye does the same thing with a hole in its own wiring. Where the optic nerve leaves the eye there are no receptors at all, and yet nobody sees a patch of nothing in the middle of the visual field; the surrounding colour and pattern are extended across the gap. This is studied under the name perceptual filling-in, and Komatsu surveyed the mechanisms in 2006: the interpolation happens early, in the visual cortex, and it is not something the observer consents to or can undo.
The fill-in reaches even what a person takes to have happened. A scene can change in a large and obvious way — an interlocutor swapped mid-conversation, a wall repainted — and the change goes unseen unless attention is drawn to it. Rensink, O'Regan and Clark measured this in 1997 under the name change blindness, their phrase for the fact that seeing a scene is not seeing every part of it. In 1999 Simons and Chabris had observers count ball passes in a film, and roughly half of them did not see a person in a gorilla suit cross the set. The eye was open, the stimulus was in plain view, and no record was kept.
The body fills in as well, and there the construction is of the self rather than of a room. A limb removed years ago can still itch, ache, and be moved on command. Ramachandran and Hirstein set out the account of phantom limbs in 1998: the map the brain keeps of the body goes on reporting a part that is no longer there, and the report can be edited by putting the missing hand in front of a mirror.
The accounts of this family differ in their details. The view now widely held is that perception is a construction held in check rather than a registration — the brain proposes a world and lets the senses correct it, an account developed by Andy Clark and called, in Seth and Clark's phrase, a controlled hallucination. The word hallucination is not a slur on perception. The construction is usually right, because it was bought by long experience of a world that holds still. And it is also the cheaper way to meet the world: to model what is coming is to spend less on measuring it, and the fill-in is where the saving shows. The brain pays in advance so that it does not have to pay in full at every moment.
Which is precisely why it matters to the argument of this essay. A science that puts the eye first has put first the sense whose filling-in is least visible, because a picture looks like a record. A sound passes in time and is obviously gone, so its gaps are obvious. A photograph sits on the page, keeps its edges, and never says what it left out. The eye's interpolations arrive wearing the costume of evidence.
The ear's fill-ins are the ones a listener can catch: a pitch that is not in the wave, a place in neither ear, a roughness in no note. That is not because the ear is less constructive than the eye. It is because the ear's constructions have a physical description an instrument can check — a component that is absent, a delay between two channels, a pair of tones — while the eye's interpolations have no such ledger. A science that trusts the eye therefore owes itself more scrutiny, not less, and the scrutiny has to be paid for in the same currency everything else in this essay has cost: time, attention, and the willingness to hear that the record is not the thing.
So hearing reports a place that is in neither ear, a source that stands out from a dozen arrivals, a pitch that is not in the wave, and a dissonance that is in no note. Each time, the information is carried by the relation and not by the thing. This is not a striking way of putting it. It is a description of what the organ does continuously, without being asked, in a person who is not thinking about acoustics at all.
This is where the essay returns to the claim I have kept arriving at from other directions, and it is the claim everything else is built on: understanding the universe is predicated on understanding relationships. In hearing that claim stops being a philosophical preference and becomes physiology. The eye is very good at things. The ear is very good at between. A discipline that trains only the first will keep mistaking the inventory for the account.
Direction, shape, thermodynamics.
Everything the ear adds falls into the three columns I have been working with, which is the reason this essay is not really about hearing.
Direction. The ear's first gift is a which way, and the which way is a relation. The position lives in the comparison between two channels, neither of which contains it, and in the order of several arrivals rather than in any one wave. It comes from every bearing at once, from behind the head, in the dark, through sleep, and it does not have to be pointed. A sense whose whole output is a bearing is a sense built for an animal that has to decide where to go.
Shape. The second column is the fullest, and the ear fills it before anyone decides to look. The cochlea separates a wave into its frequencies by its own construction, so a chord arrives at the nerve already analysed. Out of one pressure wave a listener recovers a dozen sources, none of them labelled. A pitch is heard that is not present in the wave at all, inferred from the spacing of the components that remain. An interval is consonant or dissonant although neither tone carries the property. And the shapes do not stay inside the ear: a high pitch wears smallness, brightness, pointedness and height, and a nonsense word picks out a round or a spiky figure in most but not all languages. Each of these is a shape recovered from a relation, and the eye's instruments cannot recover one of them without being told beforehand what was put in. To this column belongs every case in which the sense supplies what the stimulus does not contain — the restored phoneme, the filled gap in the visual field — and there the shape is the brain's contribution as much as the world's.
Thermodynamics. The third column is the one the ear pays out of. It spends energy in order to hear, the active process amplifying faint input more than a hundredfold and compressing a range of a million to one into what a person can hear, so its own selectivity is bought and not given. It costs time, since a minute of sound costs a minute of listening and will not be hurried, and a science in a hurry chooses the faster sense. And it brings feeling into the room with it, which will not stay outside. And the filling-in belongs here too, since a prediction is the cheaper way to meet the world: the brain models in advance so that it need not measure every detail, and the bill for that economy arrives as a confident wrong report. The filmmaker pays all three deliberately and calls it telling a story. Science has trained itself to pay none of them and calls that rigour.
So the three columns are filled, and filled from the sense the discipline consults last. That is the finding of this essay, said plainly: hearing is not decoration laid over a visual account. It carries direction, it carries shape, and it carries the bill. Which is also why it belongs with the rest of my work rather than standing apart from it, since the same three headings are the ones everything else is written under.
I do not yet know what a science that heard as well as it saw would look like. I do know that some of my own theories only took their shape when I began to hear them as processes rather than see them as pictures: a tension winding, a resonance building, a release paid for in energy. If nature gave hearing so much complexity and power, perhaps the question is not whether science can afford to listen, but what it has been missing by not listening.
Note on the sources — added by Charlie, 2 November 2026. The physiology named below is published and checkable; the reading drawn from it is hers.
- Cochlear frequency analysis: G. von Békésy, “Travelling Waves as Frequency Analysers in the Cochlea,” Nature 225 (1970); overview in “Mechanics of the Mammalian Cochlea,” PMC3590856.
- The active ear: M. Gold, “Hearing. II. The physical basis of the action of the cochlea,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B 135 (1948); “Integrating the active process of hair cells with cochlear function,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 15 (2014).
- Auditory timing: gap detection near three milliseconds in “Tests of human auditory temporal resolution,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 159 (2026); click discrimination in the tens of microseconds in the “Auditory-Visual Interactions” chapter of the USAARL Human Factors Design Standard.
- Binaural timing: “Smallest perceivable interaural time differences,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 145 (2019); “Early Binaural Hearing,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 42 (2019).
- Flicker fusion: “Critical flicker fusion frequency: confounders and caveats,” European Journal of Applied Physiology (2025); typical adult values around 35–40 Hz.
- One mixture, many sources: E. C. Cherry, “Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, with One and with Two Ears,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 25 (1953); A. S. Bregman, Auditory Scene Analysis: The Perceptual Organization of Sound, MIT Press (1990).
- Room from its reverberation: “Auditory perception of reverberant surroundings,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 105 (1999); “Using Acoustic Information to Perceive Room Size,” Perception 42 (2013).
- Hearing in sleep: “Sound asleep, yet still listening: auditory processing during human sleep,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences (2026).
- Two ears, one place: J. W. Strutt (Lord Rayleigh) set out the duplex account in 1907, that the ear localises low tones by interaural time difference and high tones by interaural level difference; survey in "Psychophysics and Neuronal Bases of Sound Localization in Humans," PMC3858499 (2013), and "Auditory localization: a comprehensive practical review," PMC11267622 (2024).
- First arrival governs: H. Wallach, E. Newman and W. Rosenzweig, "The Precedence Effect in Sound Localization," American Journal of Psychology 62 (1949); the later account of fusion, localisation dominance and discrimination suppression is C. Shinn-Cunningham, "The precedence effect," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 106 (1999).
- A pitch that is not in the wave: J. F. Schouten, R. J. Ritsma and B. Lopes Cardozo, "Pitch of the Residue," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 34 (1962) 1418-1424; the earlier statement of the effect is Schouten, "The residue, a new component in subjective sound analysis," Proceedings of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- An interval, not a tone: H. Plomp and W. J. M. Levelt, "Tonal Consonance and Critical Bandwidth," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 38 (1965) 548; the reading they modify is von Helmholtz's.
- Register and the interval: Plomp and Levelt’s 1965 measurements treat the transition range between consonant and dissonant as a function of frequency; register’s effect on judged consonance through roughness is measured in "Register impacts perceptual consonance through roughness and sharpness," PMC9166839 (2021); the varying band width follows D. D. Greenwood’s cochlear frequency-position function, Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 87 (1990).
- Why most people prefer consonance: J. H. McDermott, A. J. Lehr and A. J. Oxenham, "Individual Differences Reveal the Basis of Consonance," Current Biology 20 (2010) 1035-1041 — across more than two hundred and fifty listeners, only the preference for harmonic spectra tracked the preference for consonant over dissonant chords.
- Major, minor, and the listener: the major triad is held to be more consonant because it has a clearer root rather than because it beats less (commentary on Cook and Fujisawa, doi:10.18061/1811/24149); the happy/sad reading of major and minor is argued to rest on culture-dependent familiarity and associative conditioning ("Perceptions of happy and sad music may not be universal," report of Western Sydney University work, phys.org, 2022); harmonic organisation carries both universal and culture-specific cues among two communities in northwest Pakistan (PubMed 33439887, 2021); basic emotions were recognised in Western excerpts by listeners with no prior exposure to them (Fritz et al., "Universal Recognition of Three Basic Emotions in Music," Current Biology 19 (2009)).
- The rise across a century: a wider range of chord categories in use across three twentieth-century popular genres is modelled in F. C. Moss and E. Nakamura, "Modeling the Evolution of Harmony in Popular Music from Different Cultural Contexts," Computational Humanities Research 2024; inharmonicity and noisiness in recorded popular sound are tracked decade by decade in "The evolution of inharmonicity and noisiness in contemporary popular music," arXiv:2408.08127 (2024); the explicit programme is Schoenberg's, whose phrase first appears in his 1926 essay "Opinion or Insight?" (survey in "Emancipation of the dissonance").
- The line "understanding the universe is predicated on understanding relationships" is her own, recurring through the published volume. Nothing above establishes it. The physiology is the ground it is said on, not a proof of it.
- Distance from sound, and its bias: "Auditory distance perception in humans: a review of cues, development, neuronal bases, and effects of sensory loss," PMC4744263 (2015); open-field measurement in "Auditory and visual performance in an open sound field," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America (2012) and "Auditory Perception in Open Field: Distance Estimation," US Army Research Laboratory report ADA588823 (2013).
- The senses filling in for one another: C. Spence and O. Deroy, "Crossmodal correspondences: A tutorial review," Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 73 (2011); "Crossmodal Correspondences: Standing Issues and Experimental Guidelines" (2016), which notes the phenomenon as a general trait of multisensory perception, found beyond our own species.
- Sound changing taste: A.-S. Crisinel, S. Cosser, S. King, R. Jones, J. Petrie and C. Spence, "A bittersweet symphony: Systematically modulating the taste of food by changing the sonic properties of the soundtrack playing in the background," Food Quality and Preference 22 (2012) 79-82, where the food was held constant and only the soundtrack changed; the wider literature is surveyed in "Crossmodal interactions between audition and taste: A systematic review and narrative synthesis," Food Quality and Preference (2023).
- Shape from a nonsense word: "The bouba/kiki effect is robust across cultures and writing systems," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 377 (2021), PMC8591387, testing speakers of twenty-five languages and ten writing systems; the spread from full agreement in one language to thirty-six per cent in another, and the three languages showing no effect, are reported in that paper and in the Science news account of it.
- Rough and smooth as reports from the hand: S. Arroyo and S. Lev-Ari, "Trilled /r/ is associated with roughness, linking sound and touch across spoken languages," Scientific Reports 12 (2022), doi:10.1038/s41598-021-04311-7; the wider pattern for r-like consonants in "Not just the alveolar trill, but all 'r-like' sounds are associated with roughness across languages," Scientific Reports 15 (2025), doi:10.1038/s41598-025-94850-0; matching of sound textures to real surfaces in "Crossmodal associations between naturally occurring tactile and sound textures," Perception (2024), doi:10.1177/03010066231224557.
- Where roughness sits in the modulation range: the chapter "Roughness" in the Springer volume, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-68888-4_11, which reports roughness rising to a maximum near seventy hertz of modulation and falling above it; the bound set by critical bandwidth at ordinary carrier frequencies is stated in E. Terhardt's account of auditory roughness (terhardt.userweb.mwn.de/ter/top/roughness.html), and the same dependence on auditory filter width at low frequencies is measured in "Roughness and the critical bandwidth at low frequency," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 97 (1995) 3274.
- A word supplied from the sentence: R. M. Warren, "Perceptual restoration of missing speech sounds," Science 167 (1970) 392-393.
- The filled gap in the visual field: H. Komatsu, "The neural mechanisms of perceptual filling-in," Nature Reviews Neuroscience 7 (2006) 362-373; the varieties of the effect are classified in "A new taxonomy for perceptual filling-in," Brain Research Reviews, published online November 2010, doi:10.1016/j.brainresrev.2010.10.004.
- Change unseen and the gorilla: R. A. Rensink, J. K. O'Regan and J. J. Clark, "To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes," Psychological Science 8 (1997) 368-373; D. J. Simons and C. F. Chabris, "Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events," Perception 28 (1999) 1053-1074.
- The limb the body still reports: V. S. Ramachandran and S. Hirstein, "The perception of phantom limbs: The D. O. Hebb lecture," Brain 121 (1998) 1603-1630.
- Perception as a construction held in check: A. Clark, "Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2013) 181-204; the phrase "controlled hallucination" is Seth and Clark's for this account, as reported in "Our brains exist in a state of 'controlled hallucination'," MIT Technology Review, 25 August 2021.
- The video at the head of the essay is “How You Hear Is Just BEAUTIFUL!” by the channel The Brain Maze. Its transcript could not be read here, so nothing above is credited to it beyond her own line that it covers the physiology of how we hear.
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